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‘‘Behavioral economics’’ improves the realism of the psychological assumptions underlying economic theory, promising to reunify
psychology and economics in the process. Reunification should lead to better predictions about economic behavior and better policy
prescriptions.
Because economics is the science of how resources are allo-
cated by individuals and by collective institutions like firms and
markets, the psychology of individual behavior should underlie
and inform economics, much as physics informs chemistry;
archaeology informs anthropology; or neuroscience informs
cognitive psychology. However, economists routinely—and
proudly—use models that are grossly inconsistent with find-
ings from psychology. A recent approach, ‘‘behavioral eco-
nomics,’’ seeks to use psychology to inform economics, while
maintaining the emphases on mathematical structure and
explanation of field data that distinguish economics from other
social sciences (1–3).
In fact, behavioral economics represents a reunification of
psychology and economics, rather than a brand new synthesis,
because early thinking about economics was shot through with
psychological insight. For example, in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Adam Smith (4) described all the ways in which
people care about the interests of others. In his later book, The
Wealth of Nations, he suggests that people get dinner ‘‘not from
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker’’ but
‘‘from the regard [of those agents] to their own interest’’ (5).
The latter passage is one of the most famous in economics,
whereas Smith’s earlier book on moral sentiments is ignored
(6). Why?
The answer is that two trends led economics and psychology
along different paths this century (although both were trying
to make their disciplines more scientific). One trend was that
theorists like Samuelson, Arrow, and Debreu worked hard at
formalizing economics mathematically, with physics as inspi-
ration. Psychologists were also inspired by natural scienc-
es—by experimental traditions rather than mathematical
structure. As a result, to an economist, a theory is a body of
mathematical tools and theorems. To a psychologist, a theory
is a verbal construct or theme that organizes experimental
regularity.
This divergence in methods and ways of expressing knowl-
edge pushed economics and psychology apart. A second trend
kept the fields apart. In the 1940s, economists took up logical
positivism with a special twist (called the ‘‘F twist’’ after its
advocate, Milton Friedman): because theories with patently
false assumptions can make surprisingly accurate predictions,
economic theories that assume that individual agents are
highly rational and willful, judge probabilities accurately, and
maximize their own wealth might prove useful, even though
psychology shows that those assumptions are systematically
false. The F twist allowed economists to ignore psychology.
Many theorists also thought that relaxing rationality assump-
tions would inevitably lead to analytical intractability. Recent
theoretical leaps have shown cases in which this guess is wrong.
Toward a Reunification
In the 1950s, the brilliant polymath Herbert Simon—later a
Nobel laureate in economics—took a run at reunifying psy-
chology and economics. He advocated theories of individuals
in economics based on algorithms that embodied cognitive
mechanisms and acknowledged the ‘‘bounded rationality’’ of
humans. Simon’s suggestion came just as economists were
finding interesting ways to study economics more mathemat-
ically; these ways were not easily integrated with algorithmic
theories.
In the 1970s, however, cognitive psychologists began study-
ing judgment and economic decision making. They took
maximization of utilities and logical rules of probability judg-
ment as benchmarks and used conformity or deviation from
these benchmarks as a way to theorize about cognitive mech-
anisms (much as optical illusions are used to understand
perception). Important psychology of this sort was done Ward
Edwards in the 1950s, and later by Amos Tversky, Daniel
Kahneman, Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, and others. The
findings of this research often consisted of psychological
principles or constructs that could be expressed in simple
formal terms, thus providing a way to model bounded ratio-
nality in terms familiar to economists.
Behavioral economics tries to incorporate this kind of
psychology into economics. Considerable progress has been
made in a couple decades, and increasingly, economists are
taking up the challenge of attaching economic theory to
psychological foundations.
Four Principles of Economic Behavior
One goal of behavioral economics is to suggest mathematical
alternatives with firm psychological foundations to rationality
assumptions. Good alternative principles should be parsimo-
nious—as Einstein said, ‘‘as simple as possible, but no sim-
pler.’’ Ideally, they should include the rational principle as a
mathematical special case to permit easy statistical measure-
ment of how much the new assumption adds and to allow that
possibility that, when stakes are high and learning is easy,
general behavior can converge to rationality. Table 1 lists four
rational principles used in economics, along with four behav-
ioral principles that are ready to be included in textbook
discussions and tried out in modeling applications.
Expected Utility Theory. Expected utility (EU) theory as-
sumes that people value risky gambles by weighting the utility
of an outcome Xi by its probability Pi, denoted SiPiu(Xi), where
u is a function that measures the value of an outcome. EU
assumes that people integrate the outcomes into their overall
wealth, and if two gambles have a common probability of a
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common outcome, that outcome is cancelled out when decid-
ing among the two gambles. EU is the foundation of theories
of asset pricing, purchase of insurance, corporate structure,
and personal decisions like investments in education. A be-
havioral alternative, ‘‘prospect theory’’ (7), incorporates psy-
chophysical features that EU ignores: people adapt to what
they have experienced and weight probabilities nonlinearly.
Adaptation implies that utilities are determined by gains and
losses from some reference point r, rather than by overall
wealth. Furthermore, people seem to ‘‘mentally account’’ for
money in separate categories, rather than adding it all together
(e.g., people will spend more from a tax refund than from an
increase in the value of their stocks or their homes, which
standard theory does not allow). Many studies suggest behav-
ior toward perceived losses and gains is different in two ways.
In ‘‘loss-aversion’’ studies, losses are disliked about twice as
much as gains equal in size to the losses are liked; people seek
risk when gambles involve only losses, such that the best they
can do is ‘‘break even’’ (i.e., reach the reference point),
whereas they avoid risk when gambles all yield gains (the
‘‘reflection effect’’). Loss-aversion can explain the large gap
between hypothetical buying and selling prices for nontraded
goods, such as environmental damage. In most surveys, people
ask for 2 to 10 times as much money to accept damage to the
environment (presumably because they are averse to the loss
of environmental purity) as they are willing to pay to clean up
the same damage, even though, in standard theory, these
selling and buying prices should generally be close together (8).
In EU, people weight a possible outcome by its probability.
In prospect theory, in contrast, people are assumed to weight
a possible outcome by a ‘‘decision weight,’’ a nonlinear trans-
formation of the outcome’s probability. Ample evidence sug-
gests that people overweigh low probabilities (7, 9). This
overweighting helps explain the widespread desire to gamble
on low-probability events (e.g., lottery tickets) and to insure
against low-probability catastrophes, which are not easily
explained by EU.
Exponential Discounting. Most economic choices yield costs
and benefits that are incurred at different points in the future.
To make choices, people must weigh the utilities of these future
costs and benefits in some way. Rational evaluation of future
consequences assumes ‘‘exponential discounting’’—future
utilities u(xt) are discounted by a weight dt, which is an
exponentially declining function of t. Exponential discounting
makes the strong prediction that the relative evaluation of two
payments depends on only the amount of delay between the
two payments. For example, people tend to prefer getting $100
now over getting $110 in a week, but they also prefer $110 in
11 weeks to $100 in 10 weeks, even though both choices involve
waiting an extra week to get $10 more (10). Exaggerated
preference for immediate reward is particularly evident in
nonhuman animals and young children and is thought to
explain adult behavior like addiction and procrastination. The
impulsive preference for immediate reward can be captured in
(quasi-) ‘‘hyperbolic discounting,’’ weighting delayed rewards
by bdt. The parameter b expresses the preference for imme-
diate reward, and d expresses the preference for reward
delayed t periods, relative to a delay of t 1 1 periods.
Exponential discounting also does not allow phenomena like
the desire to ‘‘savor’’ good outcomes by delaying them and the
fact that people like wage profiles that always increase (10).
Social Utilities. Most applications of economic theory as-
sume individuals care only about their own wealth and won’t
sacrifice to help or hurt others. Of course, such sacrifices are
common in the form of altruism and vengeance. Laboratory
experiments help uncover these ‘‘social utilities.’’ For example,
in ‘‘ultimatum games,’’ one player offers a portion of $10 to
another player and keeps the rest for herself. The responding
player can either accept the offer or reject it and leave them
both with nothing. Wealth-maximizing players will accept
anything; thus, the first player should offer very little. Surpris-
ingly to economists, in many studies in several countries, some
with very high stakes, players routinely offer about $4 of $10,
and low offers of less than $2 are rejected half the time (11).
Mathematical theories of social utility explain these patterns by
assuming that people dislike allocations in which they earn
different amounts than others (12) or that people like to
reciprocate (13). These theories are parsimonious, can explain
a surprisingly wide range of different experiments (such as
frequent cooperation in one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games),
and predict some new patterns as well.
Equilibrium. Economists typically study systems ‘‘in equi-
librium.’’ In a market, equilibrium means that supply meets
demand; in a strategic game, equilibrium means all agents are
choosing optimal strategies (given that others are too). As
economics developed mathematically, little attention was paid
to the process of equilibration—how an equilibrium comes
about. However, recent theory on population evolution (14),
learning from others (15), and rules of individual learning
derived from experimental observation (D. Stahl, unpublished
work), suggest parsimonious principles of equilibration. In the
most general and predictively accurate theory, people learn by
‘‘reinforcing’’ strategies that performed well or would have
performed well had they been chosen (16). This ‘‘experience-
weighted attraction’’ rule shows that two classes of learning
rules—reinforcement, mostly studied in psychology, and belief
learning, studied by game theorists—which were thought to be
fundamentally different, are closely related. Empirical learn-
ing rules like experience-weighted attraction and population
dynamics might someday supply a firm justification for the
long-standing focus on equilibrium and make fresh predictions
about when and how quickly equilibria will arise.
Table 1 also describes the psychological foundations of the
behavioral alternatives. Curiously, the rationality principles
economists have chosen as theoretical workhorses are sensible
prescriptions for ideal behavior: people would be better off if
they added their monetary funds together to make important
economic decisions, weighted outcome utilities by their prob-
Table 1. Four parsimonious behavioral replacements for rational modeling principles
Rational principle Behavioral principle Psychological foundation
Expected utility
SiPiu(Xi)
Prospect theory
Sip(Pi)u(Xi 2 r)
Psychophysics, adaptation:
loss-aversion, reflection,
mental accounting,
nonlinear p(Pi)
Equilibrium (mutual best response) Learning, evolution Generalized reinforcement,
replication by fitness
Discounted utility
Stdtu(xt)
Hyperbolic discounting
u(X0) 1 St51bdtu(Xt)
Preference for immediacy
(temptation)
Own-payoff maximixation
uX2
1 (X1, X2) 5 0
Social utility
uX2
1 (X1, X2) Þ 0
‘‘Spend’’ money
on other people
(reciprocate, dislike inequality)
Variables are defined below.
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abilities, resisted the lure of immediate satisfaction, and turned
the other cheek rather than spending money to harm enemies.
In contrast, the alternative assumptions are all justified by
psychological evidence on how people think, rather than by
normative prescription. Moving from rational principles to
behavioral alternatives means moving from theorizing about
how people should behave to theorizing about how they do
behave and forces thoughtful economists to look to psychol-
ogy.
Other rational principles have provoked behavioral critique,
but formal replacements have not yet been created. For
example, utility maximization is the assumption that people
rank objects—e.g., monetary gambles, shopping baskets of
products, and jobs—consistently enough to permit assignment
of a unique utility number u(X) to object X. Contrary to this
presumption, there is a long list of ways in which utilities
depend on how objects are described or on the way in which
choices are made; these changes suggest that preferences are
‘‘constructed’’ (17). Evidence of constructed preference is
widespread but has not yet led to a simple alternative to utility
maximization, comparable to the alternatives listed in Table 1.
Another rationality principle that has resisted replacement
so far is Bayesian probability judgment. Bayes’ rule prescribes
a precise way in which judged probabilities should be altered
in light of new information—namely, P(AuD) 5 P(DuA)P(A)y
P(D), where A is an hypothesis, D is new evidence, and P(AuD)
denotes the ‘‘posterior’’ probability of A conditional on ob-
serving the evidence D. Although normatively appealing,
Bayes’ rule is cognitively unnatural, because (i) it insists that
the order in which information arrives should not affect
judgment (contrary to experimental evidence that quite old
and quite new information weigh more heavily); and (ii) it
insists that belief in A, measured by P(A), and evaluation of the
data, measured by P(DuA), be independent. This independence
is violated when beliefs about what is likely influence encoding
of evidence, which is called ‘‘top-down’’ processing in percep-
tion and is manifested by ‘‘confirmation bias’’ in psychology
(i.e., people see new evidence as more consistent with their
beliefs than it really is; ref. 18).
One alternative to Bayes rule is a set of ‘‘heuristics’’ (19),
such as availability (easily retrievable information is over-
weighted) and representativeness (hypotheses that are well
represented by evidence are thought to be likely), but these
have not been codified mathematically. Another alternative,
used recently to model price swings in the stock market (20),
is that people use Bayes’ rule based on the evidence they
perceive but incorrectly specify the initial set of hypotheses
about how events occur.
What’s Next?
The only active resistance to behavioral economics is based on
the pessimistic fear that the psychological evidence is too
fragmented to suggest coherent formal alternatives to ratio-
nality. Table 1 shows that this pessimism has been proven
wrong four times. Utility maximization and Bayesian updating
have admittedly proved harder to replace, but there are many
ideas in the air, and progress is likely.
Behavioral economics has also been used to explain and
predict field phenomena. Prospect theory has been used to
explain stock market pricing anomalies (N. Barberis, M.
Huang, and T. Santos, unpublished work), to explain asym-
metric responses of consumers to price increases and de-
creases, and to predict downward-sloping labor supply among
cab drivers (i.e., driving more hours when wages were lower,
paradoxically; ref. 21). Hyperbolic discounting has been used
to explain addiction and procrastination (22), as well as
patterns in savings and consumption (23).
Behavioral economics can also provide a more realistic and
thoughtful basis for making economic policy. Because rational
people make few mistakes, policies aren’t necessary to help
them. Relaxing rationality assumptions therefore permits rea-
soned argument about how people can be helped. For example,
if people weight the future hyperbolically rather than expo-
nentially, they will impulsively buy goods they will soon regret
having bought. A good policy to help those who weight the
future hyperbolically is a mandatory ‘‘cooling off’’ period that
permits ‘‘hot’’ consumers to renege on purchase decisions for
a short period of time, such as 3 days. (Many states have such
policies.) Cooling-off policies exemplify ‘‘conservative pater-
nalism’’—they will do much good for people who act impul-
sively and cause very little harm (an unnecessary 3-day wait)
for those who do not act impulsively; thus, even conservatives
who resist state intervention should find them appealing.
Behavioral economists hope to look back soon and regard
rational assumptions like exponential discounting, self-
interest, or even equilibrium as special examples of much more
general theories, much as simple functional forms [e.g., u(x) 5
log(x)] are used in lieu of more general forms just for simplic-
ity. Then behavioral economics will cease to be a distinctive
label for an approach as it becomes part of mainstream
economic thinking, evincing a healthy reunification of psy-
chology and economics.
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